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WHEN PRINCIPLED REPRESENTATION
TESTS ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
TERRI
SCUIT

L.

R.

DAY*

ROGERS**

In this life we prepare for things, for moments and events and situ
ations . . .. We worry about things, think about injustices . ...
Then, all of a sudden, the issue is not whether we agree with what
we have heard and read and studied. . . . The issue is us, and what
we have become. 1
INTRODucnON

At one point in time, every lawyer or would-be lawyer ponders
the decision to become a lawyer. Some give it more consideration
than others; some base their decisions on practical considerations
while others contemplate lofty goals. For some, the decision is
based on a realistic view of the legal profession and the roles law
yers play while, for others, the decision is premised on an unrealis
tic depiction of lawyers, Hollywood-style.
Whatever the configuration of conjured images of lawyers and
the legal profession, each would-be lawyer must necessarily settle
on a vision of where she belongs within these images and a set of
aspirations to be obtained through entering the profession.
Have these aspirations been met? Is one disappointed by the
reality of practicing law? Periodically, along the way from novice to
experienced lawyer, one should ask the questions: as a lawyer, am I
honoring the legal profession-"professionalism looking outward";
and as an individual, is my legal practice consistent with my own
sense of right and wrong-"professionalism looking inward."
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versity of Wisconsin; M.S.S.A., Case Western Reserve University; J.D., University of
Florida; LL.M., Yale Law School.
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Often the answers to these questions are found in the decisions law
yers make about the clients and causes they represent.
Imagine an attorney who has built a reputation representing
victims of race discrimination. Early in her career, when the law
overwhelmingly favored her opponents, she persevered with a deep
passion and certainty in the correctness of her cause. In her heart,
she knew that the law and public sentiment were at odds with fun
damental fairness and decency. Over time, her legal arguments and
those of her like-minded colleagues began to erode the status quo.
The legal and social environment-in part due to her efforts-be
gan to change so that once unpopular notions and positions fell into
favor and gained broad acceptance. This is why she became a law
yer: to help dismantle the unjust discrimination she observed and
regarded as antithetical to a humane and decent society.
She sleeps well at night knowing that she has made a differ
ence. She looks forward to each day with the knowledge that she
will continue to make a difference. One day her 9:00 a.m. appoint
ment arrives. A white woman explains that she was rejected from
graduate school because the university she applied to had instituted
an affirmative action program which she felt to be unconstitutional.
Despite the attorney's pro-affirmative action stance, she sought the
attorney's counsel because of her broad experience and under
standing of the nuances of discrimination law.
The attorney politely informs the client that she cannot take
the case. To her, affirmative action policies are a lawful response to
historic invidious discrimination. She explains that she has devoted
her practice to advancing racial equality, a legal principle in which
she believes strongly, one which forms the bedrock of her individ
ual sense of justice. She cannot in good conscience take the client's
case for she cannot zealously represent her without silencing that
inner voice that tells her the difference between what is right and
what is wrong. The prospective client listens and asks whether the
attorney could "in good conscience" take on the case of any Cauca
sian person with a similar claim of discrimination. The attorney re
plies that she cannot. Is the attorney engaging in race-based
discrimination or is she declining the case for reasons of
conscience?
The decision in Stropnicky v. Nathanson 2 disregards entirely
the professional and personal considerations that drive the attor
ney's decision whether or not to accept a case, and focuses exclu
2. 19 M.D.L.R. (Landlaw, Inc.) 39 (MeAD Feb. 25, 1997).
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sively on societal concerns with eliminating discrimination. In so
doing, it overlooks a long-lived deference accorded attorneys in the
decision of whether to accept or decline a client's case and the legit
imate rationale underlying such deference.
In Stropnicky, the Massachusetts Commission Against Dis
crimination ("Commission") held that attorneys' client selection
decisions are to be regulated by the Massachusetts public accom
modation law. 3 Ms. Nathanson, an attorney specializing in divorce
law, refused to take Mr. Stropnicky's case because she had pre
mised her practice on advancing the cause of women in the family
law area in an effort to remedy past and present gender bias in the
courts. Mr. Stropnicky had sought representation from Ms. Na
thanson based on her reputation in the family law area. 4
Mr. Stropnicky was the stay-at-home partner in the marriage,
and, as the economically disadvantaged partner, sought out Ms. Na
thanson who was well known for representing women who had such
traditional roles. 5 Claiming that Ms. Nathanson had discriminated
against him on the basis of his gender, Mr. Stropnicky brought the
instant action before the Commission which fined Ms. Nathanson
$5,000 for engaging in unlawful gender discrimination in violation
of the Massachusetts public accommodation law. 6
In deciding Stropnicky, a case of first impression in Massachu
setts, the Commission entered a growing debate on whether lawyers
and law firms are subject to public accommodation laws. Nowhere
is there evidence that the Massachusetts Legislature intended the
law to be applied to a lawyer's client selection decision. The Com
mission's decision, however, reaches to the deeper issue of whether
lawyers are to retain traditional unfettered discretion in making cli
ent selection decisions or whether they are to be constrained in
3. According to Massachusetts public accommodation law "any distinction, dis
crimination or restriction on account of ... sex .•.. relative to the admission of any
person to, or treatment in any place of public accommodation" is unlawful. MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98 (1997).
4. See Stropnicky, 19 M.D.L.R. at 39.
5. See id. at 40.
6. See id. Place of public accommodation is "any place, whether licensed or unli
censed, which is open to and accepts or solicits the patronage of the general public ...."
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 92A (1997). The Commission found that the definition was
broad enough to include a law office. Other jurisdictions addressing whether profes
sionals fall within the definition of a "public accommodation" have found otherwise.
See Robert T. Begg, Revoking the Lawyers' License to Discriminate in New York: The
Demise of a Traditional Professional Prerogative, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 275, 335-43
(1993).
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making such determinations by the competing policy concern. of
eliminating discrimination.
This paper will address how the Stropnicky decision intrudes
into the important discretion historically accorded lawyers in decid
ing whether to represent a client. By seeking to require an attorney
to undertake a matter that he would otherwise refuse as a matter of
conscience, the decision pits the rules that regulate lawyers against
themselves. Not every lawyer will be able to meet the requirements
of zealous advocacy under conditions of personal, political or ideo
logical aversion. Whereas the rules permit an attorney to decide for
herself whether a client's best interests will be advanced when these
interests clash, application of the Massachusetts public accommoda
tion law, without regard to these ethical and professional considera
tions, threatens both an attorney's professional autonomy in
matters of conscience as well as serve to undermine a client's well
being, and ultimately the legal profession. Part I is a concise review
of the professional responsibility rules that pertain to the attorney's
duties and prerogatives in the selection of a client. These rules,
which regulate and offer guidance to facilitate the avoidance of con
flicts of interest and other ethical dilemmas, have always recognized
the importance of placing the client selection decision squarely
within the attorney's discretion. Part II proposes an analytical
framework for assessing the internal and external factors which un
derlie such discretion as articulated by the professional responsibil
ity rules. Part III focuses on the ways in which laudable
antidiscrimination principles may collide with the professionalism
concerns that accord a lawyer discretion in deciding whether or not
to represent a prospective client. Part IV applies the analytical
framework set forth in Part II to the facts of Stropnicky. The con
clusion suggests how antidiscrimination principles can coexist with
ethical and professional considerations that support discretionary
client selection decision-making without compromising either
principle.
I.

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE CLIENT SELECTION
DECISION

The legal profession did little to regulate its membership prior
to the turn of the 19th century. By 1909, however, many state bar
associations had embraced, in one form or another, the Canons of
Professional Ethics ("Canons").? Among the 32 Canons originally
7.

In 1908, the American Bar Association adopted a set of rules for lawyers called
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adopted by the American Bar Association, Canon 31, which dealt
with the matter of discretion in the client selection process, pro
vided that "[n]o lawyer is obliged to act either as [an] advisor or
advocate [by] every person who may wish to become his client. He
has the right to decline employment. Every lawyer upon his own
responsibility must decide what [employment] he will accept as
counsel .... "8 The American Bar Association's subsequent adop
tion of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model
Code") and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model
Rules") has not fundamentally altered the substance of these rules
as currently found in each state's code of ethics or professional
responsibility. 9
Sensitive to its monopoly on the practice of law, the legal pro
fession has long recognized the need of its membership to act so as
to secure representation for all persons. lO Accordingly, the Model
Code and the Model Rules set forth regulations and aspirational
goals in an effort to ensure the ethical and honorable practice of
law, eliminate practices that serve to discredit the profession, and
provide guidelines for attorneys to follow to minimize the likeli
hood of improper or conflicted representation. Today, the Model
Code and the Model Rules adhere to the general principle that,
absent conflict, an attorney is encouraged to take on a client's
cause. With this precept in mind, however, the rules qualify this
requirement by sanctioning an attorney's decision to refuse a cli
ent's case for good cause. l1 These rules of professional conduct
the Canons of Professional Ethics. Most states adopted the Canons through legislation,
court rules, or as rules of the state bar. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
ETIUCS 55-56 (1986).
8. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETIUCS Canon 31 (1908).
9. Approximately 40 jurisdictions have adopted some form of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct while the remaining jurisdictions continue to apply a form of the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility. See STEVEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF
LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETIUCS 3-5 (3d ed. 1992).
10. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 87 (1978).
Hazard criticizes this antiquated rationale, reasoning that "liberal admission to the legal
profession has much weakened the monopoly." Id.
11. Lawyer's are obligated to accept appointments from the bench:
A lawyer shall not seek to avoid an appointment by a tribunal to represent a
person except for good cause, such as ... (c) the client or the cause is so
repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship
or the lawyer's ability to represent the client.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONOuer ("MODEL RULES") Rule 6.2 (1994). "A
lawyer ordinarily is not obliged to accept a client whose character or cause the lawyer
regards as repugnant." Id. cmt. 1. Similarly, "A lawyer is under no obligation to act as
[an] advisor or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client; but in
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serve the dual purpose of maintaining the highest standards of pro
fessionalism 12 so that clients may be assured the best representation
possible, while at the same time recognizing a lawyer's need for au
tonomy when deciding whether to undertake a cause for which the
lawyer may feel a profound commitment or aversion.

II.
A.

Two

FACES OF PROFESSIONALISM

Professionalism Looking Outward

Lawyers wield great power and influence in the American soci
ety. Lawyers serve as the guardians of our law-dependent demo
cratic society. They have been and will continue to be key players
. in shaping how individuals and institutions deal with the great is
sues of our time. As guardians, lawyers are gatekeepers of the sub
stance, process and procedures of law enabling parties to articulate,
prosecute and defend individual claims. It is through legal repre
sentation that clients are assured open, equal and fair access to
courts and our system of justice.
The various rules of professional responsibility which require
zealous advocacy, loyalty, confidentiality, and championship of the
oppressed, poor and unpopular, serve to ensure equal access to the
courts, reinforce the high ideals of law in society and highlight the
important public service performed by lawyers. Such rules define
the standards of conduct demanded of lawyers as well as provide
the basis upon which sanctions may be meted out when a lawyer
fails to meet these standards. The 1908 Canons of Professional Eth
ics provided that the lawyer had an obligation to give "entire devo
tion to the interests of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights and the exertion[s] of [the lawyer's] utmost
learning and ability."13 Today, Canon 7 of the Model Code pro
vides that "[a] lawyer should represent a client zealously within the
bounds of the law."14 From the perspective of professionalism
looking outward, the legal community recognizes that lawyers, by
furtherance of this objective of the bar to make legal services fully available, a lawyer
should not lightly decline proffered employment." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY ("MODEL CODE") EC 2-26 (1996).
12. There is debate as to whether the professional rules articulate the highest
standards of professionalism or a minimal standard to which a lawyer must adhere.
Without responding to the debate, it is assumed that, in theory, one of the purposes of
the rules is to inspire lawyer conduct which meets the highest standards of
professionalism.
13. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 15 (1908).
14. MODEL CODE Canon 7.
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fulfilling their roles as legal technicians and undertaking a client's
cause indifferent to their own personal beliefs, serve the greater
good of securing the availability of legal services to all, along with
unqualified advocacy.ls As is discussed below, the rules are di
rected at ensuring that an attorney fully appreciates the extraordi
nary commitment she is making to devote the full extent of her
legal skills, intelligence and abilities to the representation of the cli
ent before she agrees to take on a matter. As the rules anticipate,
such an undertaking is not always possible.

B.

Professionalism Looking Inward

An attorney's decision to accept or decline the responsibility
associated with undertaking a client's case cannot be evaluated
solely on the basis of what is best for the client or what is best for
the profession. Without question, such a decision also calls for an
inquiry into what is reasonable to expect from an attorney.16 It is
no surprise that lawyers can feel passionate about the causes they
champion, that they may even base their professional raison d'etre
on the passionate representation of such cases. Accordingly, the
very same standards of professionalism that call for an attorney to
take on a cause may, at times, require a degree of fidelity to a cli
ent's cause that a lawyer finds impossible to muster. This paradox
emerges when a lawyer is asked to represent a client whose cause
she regards as repugnant. The Model Code's response that "[a]
lawyer is under no obligation to act as advisor or advocate for every
15. The metaphor of attorney as "cab driver" applied to English Barristers: "He
takes whomever beckons to whatever destination may be commanded." HAZARD,
supra note 10, at 89. Under the "cab driver" model, even the most repugnant legal
claims were entitled to be argued and provided an intellectual challenge for the oral
advocate. In contrast, professional rules have protected American lawyers from forced
representation of clients or causes the lawyer regards as repugnant. Ironically, the cab
driver metaphor may be applicable to American lawyers today out of business
necessity.
16. "Judge George Sharswood's 'Essays on Professional Ethics,' delivered to the
graduating class of the law department of the University of Pennsylvania in 1854,"
formed the basis of the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics. E. Wayne Thode, The
Ethical Standards for the Advocate, 39 TEX. L. REv. 575, 580 (1961). In his address,
Judge Sharswood asked: "'But what are the limits of his duty when the legal demands
or interests of his client conflict with his own sense of what is just and right? This is a
problem by no means of easy solution.'" Id. at 581. Judge Sharswood offers that
"[c]ounsel have an undoubted right, and are in duty bound, to refuse to be concerned
for a plaintiff in the legal pursuit of a demand, which offends [sic] his [sic] sense of what
is just and right ...." Id. (quoting George Sharswood, Professional Ethics, 32 A.B.A.
REP. 81, 96 (1907».
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person who may wish to become [a] client,"17 along with the Model
Rules' comment that "[a] lawyer ordinarily is not obliged to accept
a client whose character or cause the lawyer regards as repug
nant,"18 serve the interests of both the client and the compromised
attorney. The client is benefitted by an attorney's refusal to repre
sent him in a matter when the attorney is incapable of fully repre
senting the best interests of the client by providing zealous
representation. Relatedly, the attorney is spared the intellectual
and emotional hardship of undertaking an action for which there is
an ideological dislike, or worse, disdain, resulting in a personal/pro
fessional integrity conflict.
Much of the time, a client's cause and the legal argument that
supports it lack partisan interests to an attorney. Contract disputes
typically involve persons and circumstances that do not rouse an
attorney's intense ideological or political interests. Sometimes,
however, an attorney is asked to take on a case which requires ad
vocacy of a legal position and a construction and presentation of
facts in a manner that is inconsistent, perhaps even in direct con
flict, with strongly held· beliefs. Such representation may place the
attorney in the position of fighting for a vision of the law and of
society she condemns. For this reason, perhaps more than any
other, the rules encourage an attorney to decline representation
under such circumstances. In this regard, Professor Geoffrey Haz
ard comments that the notion of a lawyer as a mere agent of the
client
assumes th~t the law is a settled and acknowledged body of rules.
It assumes that the lawyer as advocate in court simply helps the

judge 'understand' the rules and 'discover' their application to
specific situations. It assumes that the lawyer as counsellor takes
the rules as fixed channels into which transactions must be fitted ..
It ignores altogether the role of the lawyer as lobbyist. Most im
portant, it ignores the fact that legal rules are now recognized as
being more or less uncertainly positioned guidelines in a large
field of forces. These forces include general normative concepts
of equality, utility, property, and charity, and the realities of
political and economic power.19

Hazard's assertion leads to the inevitable conclusion that "lawyers
necessarily are to some degree political actors," and that "[a] posi
17.
18.
19.

MODEL CODE EC 2-26.
MODEL RULES Rule 6.2 emt. 1.
HAZARD,

supra note 10, at 89.
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tion adopted by a lawyer on behalf of a client thus influences, even
if in a small way, the configuration of the law itself."20
Despite efforts to mollify an attorney's discomfort with the
prospect of certain types of representation vis-a-vis rules which con
done, and even praise such representation, no rule can cure the psy
chological and ethical conflicts that will sometimes arise. This
discomfort· is further compounded by the fundamental nature of
legal advocacy. For in order to prepare a case, it is essential that an
attorney embrace a set of facts and structure and present a persua
sive and oftentimes passionate argument. While the rules en
courage attorneys to accept unpopular cases without fear of reprisal
to reputation?! it is easy to do so when one is indifferent to the
cause. Furthermore, to require an attorney to represent a client
whose cause she finds repugnant is to forcibly intrude into one's
private belief system. Most of the time, an attorney's decision to
decline to represent an undesirable client or cause is a permissible
exercise of professional autonomy under the rules. There are times,
however, when because of a convergence of cause and client, such
refusal resembles class-based discrimination which society, through
its laws and collective conscience, finds intolerable.
III.
A.

DISCRIMINATION IN THE SELECTION OF CLIENTS

Public Policy Against Discrimination

The legal profession has not uniformly adopted ethical rules
which prohibit discriminatory conduct in the practice of law. 22
However, lawyers' conduct is subject to regulation by a host of con
stitutional and legislative dictates. To date, there has been no uni
versal application of antidiscrimination prinCiples to the client
selection decision.
In recognizing the need to eliminate class-based discrimination,
federal and state legislatures have enacted numerous laws in an ef
fort to fulfill the goals of equality. Federal legislation prohibiting
20. Id. at 90. With this viewpoint in mind, the client selection decision may trig
ger First Amendment issues. In her essay, Leora Harpaz analyzes the free speech im
plications of an attorney's representation of a client and discusses how Nathanson's
advocacy of Stropnicky's cause qualifies as constitutionally protected free speech. See,
e.g., Leora Harpaz, Compelled Lawyer Representation and the Free Speech Rights of
Attorneys, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 49 (1998).
21. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.2(b) C'A lawyer'S representation of a client, includ
ing representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client's
political, economic, social or moral views or activities.").
.
22. See infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
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discrimination in employment, housing, and education serve to
eradicate invidious discrimination in areas central to a free, civil
society, to protect individual liberties, to provide a remedy for vic
tims of discrimination and to deter discrimination. 23 In the past
three decades, Congress has added age 24 and disability25 to the pre
viously protected groups (i.e., race, sex, and national origin) as spe
cial classes subject to protection by antidiscrimination laws.
Complementing federal legislation, several states have passed pub
lic accommodation laws and human rights laws which prohibit nu
merous forms of public acts of discrimination. 26
Antidiscrimination legislation historically has targeted discrim
ination by public institutions and only recently has targeted private
acts of discrimination.27 More recently, legislation has been en
acted with the goal of reaching a wider range of institutions and
individuals, and protecting a larger group of people from being vic
timized by discrimination. 28 Traditionally, professional offices did
not fall within the reach of public accommodation laws. 29 However,
many state public accommodation laws have been applied to
medical and dental offices. Prior to Stropnicky, state public accom
modation laws did not enumerate and were not construed to in
clude lawyers' offices in the definition of a place of public
accommodation. 30
23. For examples of federal antidiscrimination provisions, see Equal Employment
Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000e-2000e17 (1994); Fair Housing Act, 42 u.s.c.
§§ 3601-3631 (1994); Equal Educational Opportunities Act, 20 U.S.c. §§ 1701-1710,
1712-1721,1751-1758 (1994).
24. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.c. §§ 621-634 (1994).
25. See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
26. See generally DONALD H. HERMANN & WILLIAM P. SCHURGlN, LEGAL As
PEers OF AIDS app. 2A (1991) (providing a compilation of state statutes relating to
public accommodation).
27. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (holding that federal law which
prohibits race discrimination in private contracting is applicable to a private, commer
cially operated, nonsectarian school); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (re
viewing the constitutionality of antidiscrimination laws).
28. Efforts by AIDS activists have resulted in the creation of state and local
human rights commissions which enforce public accommodation laws, and broadened
the definition of place of public accommodation to reach professional offices of doctors
and dentists. See supra note 6.
29. But cf 42 U.S.c. § 12181(7)(F) (including lawyers' offices within the defini
tion of place of public accommodation; only federal civil rights legislation to enumerate
lawyers' offices in definition of public accommodation). To date, this has not been ap
plied to client selection decisions.
30. As lawyers' offices have never been likened to common carriers or public
utilities, there has not been a duty on the part of lawyers to open their offices to every
one or to serve all. See Begg, supra note 6, at 300-01.
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Professions Regulating Themselves

Concomitant with society's over arching concerns with both
public and private discrimination, many professional organizations
have enacted professional rules which prohibit discriminatory prac
tices. In some instances, these rules reach the selection of clients.
Engineers, dentists, social workers, and physicians, for example,
have adopted ethical codes which unequivocally prohibit these pro
fessionals from refusing to provide services based on invidious
discrimination. 31
In contrast, the legal profession32 largely has refrained from
applying antidiscrimination principles to the client selection pro
cess. As set forth above, the professional responsibility rules gov
erning lawyers afford wide discretion in the decision whether to
accept a client or a cause. Refusal to represent a client may be
based on an inability to pay a fee, a dislike of the person, or out
right discrimination. 33 Such unfettered discretion permits invidious
discrimination by the very persons who have taken an oath to up
hold the Constitution34 and eradicate such discrimination. Client
selection decision motivated by discriminatory animus harms the in
dividuals involved, the profession, and the institution of justice.
Some state bar associations have taken the initiative to adopt
antidiscrimination rules relating to lawyers' conduct. These rules,
however, may only pertain to employment discrimination35 or con
duct in connection with the practice of law. 36 Whether these rules
31. See id. at 297-99 and accompanying notes.
32. California rules make discrinlination in the selection and temlination of cli
ents a violation of the ethical rules. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
33. See WOLFRAM, supra note 7, § 10.2, at 573.
34. The oath lawyers take upon admission to the practice of law includes a pledge
to uphold the Constitution of the United States and to devote oneself to public service,
and to the public good.
35. See, e.g., DISTRICf OF COLUMBIA RYLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCf Rule
9.1 (1997) ("A lawyer shall not discrinlinate against any individual in conditions of em
ployment because of the individual's race, color, ... sex ...."); VERMONT CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(6) (1996-97) ("A lawyer shall not ...
[d]iscrinlinate against any individual ... in hiring, promoting or otherwise detemlining
the conditions of employment of that individual.").
36. See, e.g., COLORADO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONOUCf Rule 1.2(f) (1997)
("In representing a client, a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that exhibits or is in
tended to appeal to or engender bias against a person ... whether that conduct is
directed to other counsel, court personnel, witnesses, parties, judges, judicial officers, or
any persons involved in the legal process."); RULES REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR
Rule 4-8.4(d) ("A lawyer shall not engage ... in conduct in connection with the practice
of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, including to knowingly, or
through callous indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against litigants, ju
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cover the client selection decision is debatable. 37 Standing alone,
the California Rules of Professional Conduct explicitly prohibit
"unlawful discrimination . . . on the basis of race, national origin,
sex, sexual orientation, religion, age or disability ... in accepting or
terminating representation of any client."38 Professionalism look
ing outward challenges the legal profession to reconcile the fact
that, unlike other professions, its members, though sworn to uphold
the rule of law, are not required to apply antidiscrimination princi
ples to the selection of clients.
IV.

BALANCING COUNTERVAILING INTERESTS

A lawyer's rejection of a client based solely on gender is dis
crimination and should not be countenanced. In contrast, a law
yer's refusal to represent an anarchist based on the lawyer's
patriotism is sanctioned by both the professional rules and society
at large. Since the refusal is based on an ideological clash, no class
based discrimination is perceived. But what happens, when for ex
ample, this same ideology which drives the client selection decision
is indelibly linked with that of a protected class? Should the policy
underlying antidiscrimination legislation give way to the lawyer's
right to autonomy in the client selection decision? Or should an
tidiscrimination considerations trump lawyer autonomy? This is
the conundrum present in Stropnicky. Is it possible to simultane
ously respect antidiscrimination principles and the lawyer's auton
omy in the client selection process? A second look at Stropnicky,
with an eye to both Ms. Nathanson's public role as a lawyer and her
personal interest in lawyer autonomy, coupled with consideration
of the factors motivating her decision, suggests that the' answer is
yes.
A.

Looking OutWard: Gender Discrimination

On the surface, Ms. Nathanson's decision to reject Mr.
Stropnicky because he is a man disserves the public interest in
open, free and fair access to the system of justice, and can serve to
disparage the profession for condoning a lawyer's right to pick and
rors, witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers on any basis, including, but not lim
ited to, on account of race, ethnicity, gender . . . ."); NEW YORK CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(a)(6) ("A lawyer [or law firm] shall not ...
unlawfully discriminate in the practice of law, including in hiring, prom~ting, or other
wise determining conditions of employment, on the basis of age ....").
37. See Begg, supra note 6, at 318-23.
38. CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuer Rule 2-400(B)(2) (1997).
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choose her client even if it runs afoul of antidiscrimination princi
ples. Furthermore, discrimination undeniably affects the individual
and, in this case, caused Mr. Stropnicky distress over being rejected
based on an immutable characteristic. 39 It is to these interests that
laws and rules which seek to curb attorney discretion are directed.
Absent a countervailing concern justifying such conduct in the cli
ent selection process, Ms. Nathanson's decision would be improper
and could constitute unlawful discrimination. 40
B.

Looking Inward: Lawyer Autonomy

The specter of unlawful discrimination is not apparent from the
perspective of Ms. Nathanson who declined to represent Mr.
Stropnicky not because he is a man, but because her professional
raison d'etre is to support women in the family law courts and to
remedy past and present discrimination of women in the family law
arena. 41 Were Ms. Nathanson required to represent Mr. Stropnicky
and thereby to advocate a position and present herself in a manner
inconsistent with her own self-concept as a person and attorney, she
could surely compromise her professional and personal integrity.
In an environment such as the family law courts, where systemic
gender biases have been officially recognized,42 Ms. Nathanson's
zealous representation of Mr. Stropnicky could well entail a reli
ance, and even a deliberate utilization of such biases. Coerced rep
resentation of Mr. Stropnicky would place Ms. Nathanson's
personal beliefs in conflict with the requirements of zealous advo
cacy. In circumstances such as this, a lawyer should have the "ethi
cal discretion" to refuse a client that is based not on "a personal
privilege of arbitrary decision, but [based on] a professional duty of
reflective judgment. "43
39. See Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 19 M.D.L.R. (Landlaw, Inc.) 39, 40 (MCAD
Feb. 25, 1997).
40. The decision in Stropnicky did not consider the public accommodation law's
potential constitutional deficiencies as applied. To the extent such legislation is found
to be unconstitutional, a lawyer's rejection of a client, though unconscionable, may be
lawful.
41. Professor Chin's essay in this volume notes the paradox Stropnicky arouses.
The "ironic general rule," he elaborates, will undermine the ideals driving antidis
crimination legislation and penalize those most intent on furthering these ideals.
Gabriel J. Chin, Do You Really Want a Lawyer Who Doesn't Want You?, 20 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 9, 11 (1998).
42. See Gender Bias Study of the Court System in Massachusetts, 24 NEW ENG. L.
REv. 745, 746-48 (1990).
43. William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1083,
1083 (1988).
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Motivating Factors: Attorneys' Refusal to Represent

In addition to the inner conflict a coerced representation may
provoke,44 forcing an attorney-client relationship in a situation
which challenges the attorney's personal belief system not only
jeopardizes the ethical requirement of zealous advocacy, it may ig
nore otherwise legitimate objectives. As much as Ms. Nathanson's
rejection of Mr. Stropnicky as a client may resemble gender dis
crimination, it is motivated not by gender animus but by a deep
commitment to a legitimate social cause. 4S
Ms. Nathanson purposely restricted her divorce practice to his
torical victims of discrimination with the goal of remedying gender
discrimination against women in the area of family law and eradi
cating gender bias in the courts. Her commitment to remedying
past discrimination serves a legitimate, lawful objective. 46
Favorable treatment to the victims of past discrimination is a form
of corrective justice. 47
44. When lawyers are called upon to represent clients, or causes they disdain, the
negative feelings about the representation unwittingly may be transferred to the clients.
See Joseph Allegretti, Shooting Elephants, Serving Clients: An Essay on George Orwell
and the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1 (1993). Dean Richard
Matasar asks, "What to do when lawyering is at odds with one's sense of right and
wrong?" Richard Matasar, The Pain of Moral Lawyering, 71 FLA. B.J. 75, 76 (1997).
Dean Matasar suggests that lawyers "[d]o what the profession demands .... [T]his is
the price of being a lawyer." Id. at 77. This approach requires the lawyer to subjugate
her personal beliefs in order to zealously represent the client or to separate her profes
sional and personal selves. See id. This latter approach might entail justifying repre
senting clients' interests that are at odds with personal beliefs by simultaneously
engaging in personally-satisfying pro bono work.
45. The relationship between such commitment and one's personal integrity is
aptly noted by Professor Miller in his essay. See Bruce K. Miller, Lawyers' Identities,
Client Selection and the Antidiscrimination Principle: Thoughts on the Sanctioning of
Judith Nathanson, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 93, 95 (1998).
46. See generally Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) (Pow
ell, J.) ("To eliminate every vestige of racial segregation and discrimination ... [is a
legitimate interest to which] race-conscious remedial action may be necessary."); Fulli
love v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978); United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
47. See Margaret Jane Radin, Affirmative Action Rhetoric, 8 Soc. PHIL. & POL'y
51 (1991).
If individuals or groups hold entitlements that positive law has failed to recog

nize, then corrective justice requires that we change the law, and if individuals
or groups hold entitlements that positive law has nominally recognized but not
enforced, then corrective justice requires that we change our inaction and en
force them. This notion does not implicate the problems currently associated
with affirmative action.
Id. Unlike affirmative action policies which disadvantage excluded persons, a lawyer's
discretion to decline a client's case is unlikely to deprive the client of legal
representation.
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Legitimate interests such as eradicating bias against a histori
cally discriminated group must be balanced against antidis
criminatory principles in evaluating the client selection decision.
When lawyers retain ethical discretion in the client selection deci
sion, justice is served by respecting the interests of both clients and
lawyers as participants in our system of justice.
CONCLUSION

In a society governed by laws, lawyers playa unique role as the
profession armed with the tools to assist those who wish to assert a
legal claim along with those who are forced to enter the legal arena
to defend an action. While in the days of the American colonies,
lawyers "for hire" were not permitted to ply their trade, and legal
causes were presented and resolved in a lay environment, the com
plexities of the developing society transformed this scenario into
one where America now claims in excess of 70% of the world's
lawyers. 48 As lawyers became a fixture upon the American scene,
efforts to regulate and guide the profession developed.
The code of ethics or professional responsibility which all law
yers are sworn to obey does not insulate the lawyer from a host of
conflicting duties and responsibilities affecting the service of clients,
the administration of justice, and the moral obligations to oneself.
The ethical rules admonish a lawyer not to decline representation
because a client or cause is unpopular and require a lawyer to rep
resent her client zealously and competently. In addition, a lawyer
enters a fiduciary relationship with her client promising a duty of
loyalty and confidentiality to the client.
Coexisting with professionalism considerations of lawyers as
public servants, the rules recognize that lawyers as advocates must
be accorded the discretion to reject causes or clients that are repug
nant to their personal views. This feature of the rules recognizes
that lawyers who must zealously represent causes that are repug
nant to their personal views cannot always reconcile the outward
looking and inward-looking aspects of professionalism. In this re
spect, a lawyer's professional and private sides are at war; a state in
which the client suffers, the lawyer and profession suffer, and the
48. The 70% figure was commonly quoted by the media after it "became a famil
iar factoid in the rhetoric of the 1992 (presidential] campaign." Marc Galanter, News
from Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENY. U. L. REv. 77, 77-78
(1993) (contending that the 70% figure is overstated; that comparing numbers of law
yers in various countries is an "apples and oranges" problem).
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administration of justice suffers. Such discretion in the client selec
tion decision should not extend as far as permiting an attorney to
engage in class-based discrimination notwithstanding personal ani
mus toward the group to which a potential client belongs. Despite
this, a lawyer must retain ethical discretion when selecting clients
that allows a balancing of interests when discriminatory considera
tions are pitted against the lawyer's personal and professional integ
rity. Lawyers must have the freedom to follow their conscience
when discriminatory concerns are offset by legitimate, lawful inter
ests. Only then will a lawyer be ready to say to oneself and the
public that "what we have become" are professionals serving the
public good while adhering to the highest standards of professional
ism, outwardly and inwardly.

